Open Access SSO
Free, privacy-first SAML 2.0 and OpenID Connect single sign-on for WordPress. Role mapping, access control, multi-IdP. No premium tier, no tracking.
Solid choice
Open Access SSO is a solid plugin choice in 2026, with a few things worth checking first. It runs on 200+ sites and was last updated 5 days ago, and scores 69/100 on our health check.
- Actively developed — last update 5 days ago
- Tested with the latest WordPress (7.1)
- Momentum — downloads up 36.8% vs the previous 30 days
- Small user base (200+ active installs)
- Very few reviews so far
- Needs PHP 8.1 or newer
How does it stack up?
Side-by-side on installs, updates, ratings & supportDaily downloads
Download spikes usually follow a new release — each site that auto-updates counts as a download.
Rankings
Where Open Access SSO stands todayWordPress.org search rankings
Live position in the plugin search, top 100| Keyword | Position |
|---|---|
| authentication | >100 |
| oidc | #13 |
| SAML | #12 |
| Single Sign-on | #36 |
| sso | #12 |
Version adoption
Share of active sites per release.
About Open Access SSO
From the official readme · v3.1.2Description
Let your team sign in to WordPress with the company login they already use — one click, no extra password to manage, reset, or chase down.
Open Access SSO connects your WordPress site to the identity provider your organisation already runs, so people log in through your trusted corporate sign-in instead of juggling yet another WordPress password. It works with any standard SAML 2.0 identity provider — the plugin’s mature, fully-featured protocol — and, new in this release, with OpenID Connect providers too. That covers Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD), Okta, OneLogin, Auth0, Keycloak, ADFS, Shibboleth, and NetIQ Access Manager (now OpenText), and it’s completely free and open-source, with no premium tier, no license key, and no upsell.
Everything below is included. Nothing is locked, metered, or “Pro.”
Why site admins choose it
- Free, forever. Every feature ships in the GPLv2-or-later codebase — full role mapping, multi-IdP, access control, and more, at no cost. No paid plan, no per-site license, no feature gates.
- Privacy-first by design. No telemetry, no analytics, no “phone home,” and no external CDN. Your configuration never leaves your site.
- Works with the identity provider you already have. Point-and-click setup for any standards-compliant SAML 2.0 or OpenID Connect provider — no developer required for normal use.
- Emergency admin access. A built-in bypass lets an admin get back in even if SSO is misconfigured — through a constant in
wp-config.phpor a pre-set bypass key. - Open and original. A clean-room, from-scratch implementation you can read and audit.
Connect it to your identity provider
- One-click sign-in via SSO — let users log in through your IdP instead of, or alongside, the WordPress login form, with optional single logout that signs them out of both at once.
- Multi-IdP support — connect several identity providers and let users pick with a login button or a simple
?idp=sluglink. - Encrypted logins handled out of the box — including the encryption that modern providers (such as NetIQ Access Manager) turn on by default and that stock PHP can’t unwrap on its own, so encrypted sign-in just works.
- Attribute mapping — map fields from your IdP (name, email, display name, and custom user data) straight onto WordPress profiles.
Control who gets in, and what they see
- Powerful role mapping — automatically assign WordPress roles based on a user’s groups or attributes, with exact, contains, or regex matching, per-IdP rules, a default-role fallback, and an option to deny anyone who doesn’t match. A built-in safeguard means SSO won’t hand out admin-level roles unless you explicitly allow it.
- Account linking — connect a first SSO login to an existing WordPress account by email (administrators are never auto-linked, for safety).
- Page and content access control — restrict pages, posts, and custom post types to chosen roles or to “logged in via SSO” users, with a per-page editor control, the handy
[oasso_restrict]shortcode, and category/tag-level rules. The same protection also covers the REST API, feeds, and oEmbed, so restricted content doesn’t leak through a side door. - Protected files and blocks — keep uploaded files behind a role check, and show or hide individual Gutenberg blocks by login status or role.
- Email-domain and redirect rules — limit SSO sign-in to approved email domains and send users to the right place after login, per IdP.
- WooCommerce integration (optional) — map attributes to billing and shipping details and auto-link customers by email; loads only when WooCommerce is active.
Stay in control after go-live
- Certificate monitoring — track your IdP’s signing-certificate expiry, get warned before it changes, detect rotation on a daily or weekly check, and optionally pin a certificate for change control, with manual, auto-trust, grace-period, or require-approval handling.
- Searchable audit log — a database-backed, filterable record of who signed in and when, with CSV export and a retention period you set.
- Force-SSO with a safety net — require SSO across the site while keeping an emergency way back in (a constant in
wp-config.phpor a pre-set bypass key), so a misconfiguration doesn’t leave you stranded. - Import / export — back up or move your entire configuration as a single JSON file.
Easy setup, no coding
Add your identity provider three ways — upload its metadata XML, paste a metadata URL, or type the details in by hand — then register your site with the IdP using the SP metadata it generates for you. It’s all in the WordPress admin. (Developers also get a documented, stable hook API when they want it.)
Privacy you can verify
The plugin keeps to itself. The only time it reaches out to the network is when you ask it to fetch your IdP’s metadata from a URL, plus an optional, off-by-default certificate-rotation check that re-fetches that same address you entered. It never contacts the author or any third party, and every setting stays in your own site’s database. The two bundled libraries it relies on (both MIT-licensed) make no network calls at all.
Security without the homework
Incoming logins are fully validated before anyone is signed in — the plugin checks the digital signature, the sender, the intended audience, expiry, and replay protection, and accepts only strong, modern cryptography by default. Your SP private keys are encrypted at rest, and the public endpoints are guarded against common abuse. Sensible, secure defaults are on out of the box; the deeper knobs are documented for the rare cases you need them.
Free and open-source
Open Access SSO is licensed GPLv2 or later, with the full source available on Codeberg. There is no premium edition and nothing to buy — what you install is the complete plugin. Its only third-party libraries (xmlseclibs and phpseclib, both MIT-licensed) are bundled and make no network calls.
Requirements
- WordPress 6.0 or newer
- PHP 8.1 or newer
- A SAML 2.0 identity provider you control or have access to
Documentation
Full guides, setup walkthroughs, and hardening advice live on Codeberg:
- Full README / technical reference — https://codeberg.org/idgold/open-access-sso
- Identity-provider setup guide (Entra ID, Okta, NetIQ Access Manager, and more) — https://codeberg.org/idgold/open-access-sso/src/branch/main/docs/identity-provider-setup.md
- Security & hardening guide — https://codeberg.org/idgold/open-access-sso/src/branch/main/docs/security-and-hardening.md
- Troubleshooting guide — https://codeberg.org/idgold/open-access-sso/src/branch/main/docs/troubleshooting.md
External Services
This plugin is a SAML 2.0 Service Provider (SP). It sends no telemetry or analytics and never connects to any service operated by the plugin author. Its only external interactions are with the SAML Identity Provider (IdP) that you, the site administrator, configure — for example Microsoft Entra ID, Okta, OneLogin, Keycloak, ADFS, Shibboleth, or NetIQ Access Manager. There is no built-in or default IdP; the IdP is chosen and operated by you or your organisation.
Identity Provider metadata fetch
When an administrator clicks “Fetch IdP Metadata from URL” in the plugin’s admin screens, the plugin makes a single server-side HTTP GET request to the metadata URL the administrator entered. No site or user data is sent beyond a standard HTTP request; the response (SAML metadata XML) is parsed and stored in your site’s database. This never happens on the front end.
Optionally, you can enable a certificate-rotation check for an IdP (off by default). When enabled, WP-Cron re-fetches that same administrator-entered metadata URL on a schedule (for example daily) so the plugin can warn you before the IdP’s signing certificate expires or changes. This is the only automatic outbound request the plugin makes, it is opt-in per IdP, and it contacts only the metadata URL you configured.
SAML single sign-on flow
When a visitor signs in through SSO, their browser is redirected to your configured IdP (carrying a standard SAML AuthnRequest). After the visitor authenticates, the IdP returns a signed SAML assertion to your site, which the plugin validates and uses to create or update the corresponding WordPress user. The data exchanged is the SAML authentication request and response — which includes the user identifier and whatever attributes your IdP is configured to release. This exchange happens only when a visitor initiates an SSO login.
Because the IdP is a service you select and operate (or that your organisation operates), its terms of service and privacy policy are defined by that provider. Consult your chosen identity provider’s own documentation for those terms (for example, the privacy and terms pages of Microsoft Entra ID, Okta, OneLogin, etc.).
Roadmap
Open Access SSO is actively developed. Here’s what’s planned next.
Under consideration
- Automated user provisioning and deprovisioning (SCIM)
- Scheduled group-to-role synchronisation
- A branded identity-provider chooser for sites with multiple providers
- Multi-factor authentication step-up hints
- Deeper WooCommerce customer field mapping
Have a feature request? Open an issue on the project repository.
Installation
- Download the .zip and upload via Plugins → Add New → Upload Plugin, or extract into
/wp-content/plugins/open-access-sso/. - Activate through the Plugins menu.
- Navigate to Tools → Open Access SSO to configure.
- Add an identity provider: upload the IdP metadata XML, paste a metadata URL, or enter the IdP fields manually.
- Copy the SP metadata URL shown on the dashboard and register your WordPress site as a Service Provider in your IdP.
- Test sign-on using the SSO button on the login page.
Changelog
Security release for Single Logout: a forged logout request could end another user's sessions (no sign-in or data exposure). Logout requests must now be addressed to this site and recent; logout responses must be signed. Clock skew is capped at 600 s. No new settings.
3.1.2
- Security: a Single Logout request arriving over the HTTP-Redirect binding could be forged. The signature was checked against the first
SAMLRequestin the URL while the last one was acted on, so someone holding any one HTTP-Redirect logout request your Identity Provider had signed could have a second, unsigned request in the same URL acted on, ending another user’s sessions. No sign-in was possible this way and no data was exposed. The signature is now checked against the very message that is processed, and a URL repeatingSAMLRequest,SAMLResponse,RelayState,SigAlgorSignatureis refused. Present since 1.4.0. Sites whose Identity Provider is configured for POST logout were affected too, because the endpoint accepts either binding. - Security: an inbound Single Logout request must now carry an ID and a recent issue time. A request with no
IDis refused; previously it skipped the single-use check added in 3.1.1 and could be delivered repeatedly. A request with noIssueInstant, one dated in the future, or one issued more than five minutes ago (plus the configured clock skew) is refused; previously a request with no expiry of its own was accepted again about ten minutes after its first use. Both attributes are required by SAML 2.0, so a conforming Identity Provider whose clock agrees with this site’s to within the clock skew is unaffected. If yours sends logout requests without them, or its clock is further off than that, those requests are now refused, and the reason is written to the debug log when debug mode is on. - Security: the
RelayStateused when answering a logout request, or after a logout response, is now the one that travelled with the message — for HTTP-Redirect, the one the signature covers. Previously a value sent in a POST body could replace the one in the URL. - Security: an inbound Single Logout request must name this site as its
Destination. Previously the attribute was optional, so a logout request that omitted it — including one your Identity Provider had signed for a different service provider — was accepted here as well. SAML 2.0 requiresDestinationon a signed message. A request refused for this reason is written to the debug log when debug mode is on. - Security: the Identity Provider’s answer to a logout started from this site must now be signed — the message itself, or the URL for the HTTP-Redirect binding — and must name the logout request it answers. Previously an unsigned answer was accepted and recorded in the debug log as a validated logout. Signing out itself is unaffected: you are signed out of WordPress before the answer arrives. If your Identity Provider does not sign its logout responses, the debug log now records them as refused (when debug mode is on). A signed message of another kind, such as a sign-in response, is no longer accepted in place of a logout response.
- Security: the Clock Skew Tolerance setting is limited to 600 seconds wherever it is used. The limit was previously enforced only by the settings form, so a larger value arriving through a configuration import widened every expiry and replay check with it. A stored value above 600 is treated as 600, and the settings screen shows the value in effect.
- Fix: a signed HTTP-Redirect logout request is verified over its parameters exactly as the Identity Provider encoded them. Previously the plugin re-encoded them first, which could reject a valid request from a provider that percent-encodes differently. A URL containing an unencoded quote was rejected for the same kind of reason.
- Fix: a logout URL that sends
SAMLRequest,SAMLResponse,RelayState,SigAlgorSignatureas an array is ignored instead of causing a server error.
3.1.1
- Fix: a
redirect_todestination containing&or?now survives the SSO round trip intact. Previously it was cut at the first&. The SSO confirmation screen also validatesredirect_tolike every other login screen. - Fix: importing a configuration now replaces each Identity Provider’s settings rather than merging over them. A key absent from the file resets to its default instead of keeping the value being replaced — including certificate pinning. Importing a file that would change an existing provider’s protocol is refused for that provider (its connection settings are kept; its mappings and rules are still taken from the file) and reported as a warning, instead of being silently locked and reported as a success. A slug listed with no provider settings is dropped rather than left half-configured.
- Fix: attribute-mapping rules targeting protected meta keys are refused on import, as they already were on save. A rule refused at sign-in now writes a debug-log entry (when debug mode is on) naming the key.
- Security: the per-login session hints (
oasso_session_index,oasso_oidc_id_token,oasso_saml_attrs) can no longer be written by an attribute mapping. A site that mapped onto these keys was breaking its own single logout; that mapping no longer applies. - Security: an inbound Single Logout request is now single-use within its validity window. A captured, signed logout request can no longer be replayed to end a user’s sessions again while it is still valid. An Identity Provider that retries with the same request ID is refused on the retry, as it already is for assertions.
- Fix: a PHP error thrown while processing a SAML response now takes the same path as a validation failure — audit entry, timing floor, error page — instead of a fatal error.
- Fix: an empty encrypted-key value in an assertion is reported as empty, not as invalid base64.
- Fix: linking an SSO identity to a user releases every previous holder of that identity, not only one, and when the user already held a different identity that release is now written to the audit log and announced through
oasso_identity_unlinked, exactly as a move between users is. - Fix: the daily replay-cache cleanup and certificate-check schedules are restored on upgrade if missing. Previously they were only created on activation, which WordPress does not run on update.
- Added a Copy button under the Service Provider metadata XML.
- Fix: the Service Provider metadata XML no longer ends with an empty line, so a copy of it pastes cleanly into an Identity Provider.
- The SSO buttons on the WordPress login screen now sit below the whole password form rather than between the password field and “Remember Me”. If you restyled the login screen, re-check it after upgrading.
3.1.0
- Security: the emergency bypass key is now stored as a one-way hash instead of in clear text. A database dump, a backup, or a read of
wp-config.phpno longer yields the key itself. - Security: the settings screen no longer displays the bypass key. It is shown once, when you set it, and cannot be looked up afterwards — closing its exposure to screenshots, screen sharing, support sessions and browser autofill.
- The Bypass Secret Key field gains a Generate button (32 random characters, safe to paste into a URL) and explicit Replace and Remove actions.
- Existing keys are hashed automatically on upgrade. You do not need to retype yours and it keeps working.
- Saving the settings page with the bypass field left empty now leaves the key unchanged rather than clearing it. Use Remove to clear it.
3.0.1
- Fix: a Single Logout request is now matched to a user within the Identity Provider that sent it. Previously an inbound logout request could end the sessions of a user linked through a different provider, if the two happened to share a NameID value. Sites with a single Identity Provider are unaffected.
- Fix:
oasso_name_idandoasso_idp— the user meta recording which SSO identity an account belongs to — can no longer be written by Attribute Mapping. A mapping rule targeting either key is now ignored, closing a path by which an Identity Provider could re-point an existing WordPress account at a different identity on every login. If you were deliberately mapping an attribute ontometa:oasso_name_id, that mapping will stop taking effect; choosing which attribute identifies a user becomes a supported setting in a future release. - Fix: an inbound logout request matching no local session is now recorded in the debug log (when debug mode is enabled) instead of passing silently.
3.0.0
- New: OpenID Connect (OIDC) Relying Party support. Open Access SSO is no longer SAML-only — configure an OpenID Connect provider (for example Entra ID, Okta, Auth0, or Keycloak) as an Identity Provider alongside your existing SAML providers, using the same role mapping, attribute mapping, and access-control features you already use for SAML. Supply the issuer URL and use “Fetch from Discovery” to populate the provider’s endpoints automatically; sign-in uses the authorization-code flow with PKCE.
- New: OIDC claims map onto the same Attribute Mapping and Role Mapping screens SAML attributes already use — a claim name plays the role a SAML attribute name would — and UserInfo is merged in, so a claim a provider only exposes there (commonly
groups) still reaches role mapping. - New: the multi-IdP selector (the login chooser and the
?idp=sluglink) treats SAML and OIDC providers alike, so a site can mix both protocols with no special configuration. - New: RP-initiated logout for OIDC providers that support it, alongside the existing SAML Single Logout.
- New: Test Connection now works against an OIDC provider too, so you can discover the exact claim names your provider sends — some send non-obvious names such as
mailoremp_type— before configuring Attribute Mapping, the same one-click check SAML has always had. - Security: ID tokens are verified only with asymmetric signature algorithms (RS256/384/512, PS256/384/512, ES256/384/512). There is no HMAC or “none”-algorithm code path to disable — not merely a check that refuses them, but no code path that could reach them.
- Security: if UserInfo is configured for a provider, a fetch that fails during sign-in stops the sign-in rather than continuing with an incomplete set of claims — a timed-out HTTP call can never silently downgrade a user’s role.
- Security: the OIDC login transaction is bound to the browser that started it (a single-use, time-limited server-side transaction plus a same-site cookie), on top of PKCE and a nonce.
- Behavior: SAML sign-in is unchanged. The OIDC engine only registers once at least one Identity Provider is configured with protocol OpenID Connect — a SAML-only site runs no new code path.
2.7.1
- Fix: signing out via SSO is now recorded in the audit log. No sign-out has ever appeared there. WordPress clears the current user before it announces the sign-out, so the audit entry was looking up a user that was already gone; and once Single Logout was switched on, the redirect to the identity provider ended the request before the audit step ran at all.
- New: the debug log now records a completed Single Logout. Only the outgoing request and outright failures were logged before, so a sign-out that worked looked identical to one that never reached the identity provider.
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All authentication plugins →FAQ
Open Access SSO: quick answers
Straight answers, pulled from live WordPress.org data.
Source: WordPress.org
Is Open Access SSO free?
Yes. Open Access SSO is free to download and use from the official WordPress.org plugin directory.
Is Open Access SSO safe to use in 2026?
Open Access SSO is a solid plugin choice in 2026, with a few things worth checking first. It runs on 200+ sites and was last updated 5 days ago, and scores 69/100 on our health check.
How many websites use Open Access SSO?
Open Access SSO is active on 200+ WordPress websites and has been downloaded 2,724 times since it launched in June 2026. It was downloaded 1,015 times in the last 30 days.
Does Open Access SSO work with WordPress 7.1?
Yes. The developer has tested Open Access SSO up to WordPress 7.1.5, the latest release. It requires WordPress 6.0 or newer.
What PHP version does Open Access SSO need?
Open Access SSO requires PHP 8.1 or higher. Most hosts run PHP 8.x today, so it works on any modern WordPress hosting.
When was Open Access SSO last updated?
The latest version, 3.1.2, was released on November 16, 2026 (5 days ago).
Who makes Open Access SSO?
Open Access SSO is developed and maintained by idgold.
What are the best alternatives to Open Access SSO?
The most popular alternatives to Open Access SSO are Limit Login Attempts (200K+ installs), Two Factor (100K+ installs) and WPS Limit Login (100K+ installs).
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